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Joachim Wündisch 
This paper identifies and offers solutions for three problems of attribution that arise in 
the context of any theory of compensation for loss and damage due to climate change. 
The first problem of attribution concerns the question of whether a specific set of 
emissions did in fact cause harm. The second problem of attribution arises because it is 
fundamentally uncertain whether a specific harm was indeed caused by anthropogenic 
climate change. The third problem of attribution relates to the query which specific 
harm was caused by whom.1 
1. Introduction 
At the center of the debate in climate ethics there are questions regarding distributive 
justice – most notably that of the just distribution of emission rights (Shue 1999, Singer 
2002: Ch 2, Jamieson 2005, Baer 2010 etc.). The just distribution of these rights is 
essential to the project of climate change mitigation and thereby to the reduction of future 
loss and damage brought about by greenhouse gas emissions. However, given that climate 
change and its harms are upon us and given that they will intensify for decades to come, it 
is equally important and urgent to solve the intricate challenges brought about by the 
compensation for harms that are due to climate change (IPCC 2013). This urgency is 
underlined by the fact that the UN climate talks in Qatar (12/2012) yielded an agreement 
that states vulnerable to climate change may rightly demand compensation for “loss and 
damage” associated with climate change (Pearce (2013), COP 18: Decision 3/CP.18) but 
that not even the underlying theoretical problems posed by such a compensatory process 
are fully understood, let alone solved. Unfortunately, the philosophical debate regarding 
climate change and compensatory justice is scarcely developed and cannot fill this void 
(Jamison 2010). 
In this context the here presented paper seeks to explore and offer solutions for three 
problems of attribution. These problems present challenges for any theory of 
compensation for loss and damage due to anthropogenic climate change. We standardly 
assume that a theory of compensation relies on the knowledge that an agent has caused 
the specific loss or damage that is to be compensated. Therefore, it appears that we need 
to be able to attribute specific damages to specific agents. From these circumstances there 
arise three interrelated problems of attribution. For one, some philosophers challenge the 
view that individual – rather than collective – emissions cause climate change and that 
they, therefore, cause harm. For another, it is still today considered to be very difficult if 
                                                        
1 Natur-/Umweltphilosophie, 30/9/2014, XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Philosophie 2014 (Münster). 
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not impossible to judge whether a specific weather event – such as a flood or a storm – is 
anthropogenically caused. Consequently, it is next to impossible to answer the question of 
who harmed whom.  
As a prelude to and basis for the main part of the paper, section two considers competing 
views on causal and moral responsibility for climate change. Section three develops and 
addresses the three problems of attribution, before section four serves as a conclusion.  
2. Causal and Moral Responsibility for Climate Change 
A prerequisite for successful claims to compensation for climate change harms is the 
establishment of causation and moral culpability. Already at this junction, climate change 
compensation encounters fundamental theoretical challenges. Among others, Posner and 
Sunstein (2007) correctly point out that it is extremely challenging to establish that 
climate change – or even a specific set of emissions – has “caused” a certain climatic 
event such as a storm or a flood. The authors conclude that claims to compensation may 
already fail at this junction. This challenge is indeed at the heart of the theoretical 
challenges posed by climate change compensation efforts and requires far more detailed 
analysis than what is offered by the authors or studies in environmental law more 
generally.  
Further, Posner and Sunstein (2007) call into question whether the culpability necessary 
to ground claims to compensation can be established. They claim that if the majority of 
polluters do not reduce their emissions, it is not negligent for individuals to do the same, 
simply because the effect of individual emissions is so small. They transpose this analysis 
on the level of governments by claiming that even the U.S. government does not act 
negligently in refraining from reducing their emissions because unilateral climate 
mitigation action is argued to have little to no effect. 
These critiques, based on the problem of establishing causality and moral culpability, 
have undergone more detailed analysis within philosophy – unfortunately quite 
independently of their treatment in the context of environmental law (Sinnott-Armstrong 
2005, Sandler and Cafaro 2005, Fiala 2010, Kagan 2011, Nefsky 2011, Hiller 2011). Given 
the causal connection between CO2 emissions and climate change harms, it may from the 
outset appear to be obvious that not only political actors but also individuals are in breach 
of their moral responsibilities if they do not curtail climate change by reducing their 
individual emissions. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong disagrees deeply and presents a careful 
analysis, to the effect that individuals are neither causally nor morally responsible for 
climate change (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005).  In essence, Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to 
show that individual emissions are simply too small to have any effect on the climate (for 
a supporting position see Sandberg 2011). From this he famously concludes that we do 
not have a moral obligation to avoid emissions by forgoing a pleasurable drive on any 
given Sunday.  In a similar vein, but with a broader range of applications and different 
intentions, Ronald Sandler argues that “even a person’s entire lifetime impact […] on any 
longitudinal collective action problem is likely to still be inconsequential” (Sandler 2010: 
172). 
These arguments regarding collective causation and collective responsibility go back to 
Derek Parfit’s seminal work “Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics” in his Reasons and 
Persons (Parfit 1984: Ch. 3). Based on this, Shelly Kagan analyses cases of collective harm 
– much like anthropogenic climate change – where although each individual action seems 
to make no difference, all actions taken together bring about (significant) harm (Kagan 
2011). These cases obviously pose a real challenge to consequentialist moral theories as 
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well as attempts to decipher what compensatory justice demands under these 
circumstances. According to Kagan, these cases can be categorized as triggering cases, 
imperceptible difference cases, or mixtures of the two classes (Kagan 2011: 119). 
Triggering cases feature – as their name indicates – a triggering act which, when being 
performed, brings about the harm in question. As it is unknown which individual action 
triggers the collective harm, all individuals face uncertainty as to whether their act is the 
triggering act. It may be overwhelmingly likely that any specific individual act is without 
consequence, but given the possibility of triggering the collective harm, the expected value 
of each act is, as Kagan argues, negative (Kagan 2011: 120). This makes triggering cases 
unproblematic from the perspective of consequentialist theory because they can 
straightforwardly be evaluated on the basis of their expected value. 
Cases of imperceptible difference, however, are a different matter. In these cases it is 
guaranteed that no single act can make a morally significant difference. Cases of 
imperceptible difference are immune to appeals based on their expected utility and, 
therefore, problematic for consequentialist accounts and accounts of compensation.2  
Kagan proceeds to argue that, for conceptual reasons, cases of imperceptible difference 
simply cannot exist: rather they are concealed triggering cases that can in turn be 
analyzed by the familiar tool of an expected utility calculation (Kagan 2011: 132, 139). 
Avram Hiller employs an analysis similar to that of Kagan to argue against Sinnott-
Armstrong that we do in fact have a moral duty to avoid unnecessary or luxurious 
individual emissions of greenhouse gases such as those caused by a pleasurable drive on 
any given Sunday (Hiller 2011).  
However, Julia Nefsky builds the general and Dale Jamieson offers the applied case for 
why the triggering case analysis, in their view, does not hold (Nefsky 2011, Jamieson 
2014). While Nefsky does not build the positive argument that imperceptible difference 
cases exist, she does attempt to show that Kagan’s analysis fails because it supposedly 
relies on an implausible premise about pain reports (Nefsky 2011). Jamieson argues that 
the climate system is simply far too complex and the relation between carbon emissions 
and harms far too tenuous to be compared with, for example, an overflowing bathtub, 
where the last drop of water triggers the harm in question (Jamieson 2014: Ch. 6.2). 
Whether the molecules of carbon we emit end up in the atmosphere, the biosphere, or the 
oceans is fundamentally unknown (Volk 2010). 
Given the limited scope of this paper, I cannot offer independent arguments for the causal 
responsibility of individual emitters for climate change. Rather, I simply assume that the 
general view offered by Kagan is correct and that indeed for conceptual reasons collective 
action problems such as climate change amount to (concealed) triggering cases that can 
be addressed based on the theory of expected value. To simplify even further, I also 
assume that the resulting causal responsibility of agents implies their moral 
responsibility. Therefore I disregard questions pertaining to the potential for excusable 
ignorance or even the possibility that countervailing considerations (such as the 
importance of emissions for subsistence) justify certain emissions.   
                                                        
2 Note that I am simplifying here for expository reasons. Cases of imperceptible difference are also 
unproblematic for consequentialist theories if the actions in question cause real – albeit 
imperceptible – harm. Thus, if a person is harmed unknowingly, the consequentialist faces no 
problem in calling the act, prima facie, wrong. Thus the debate about imperceptible difference cases 
focuses on cases where the imperceptible difference caused by the act in question “does not itself 
constitute a harm” (Kagan 2011: 130). 
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3. Three Problems of Attribution 
What expected value theory leaves us with is not sufficient for a strong theory of 
compensation. Prospectively, the understanding that my emissions might trigger a 
potential but serious harm can be a very good reason not to emit. However, when dealing 
with compensation for loss and damage that has in fact occurred in the past, we are 
standardly dealing with the question whether my emissions did in fact trigger harm. This 
is the first problem of attribution. Even if it is true that I should not have emitted because 
I could have triggered harm, this does not imply that I did trigger harm and that I am, 
therefore, liable for claims to compensation. Given current epistemic limitations (e.g. the 
absence of a complete understanding of the climate system and knowledge of the causal 
influences and history of every molecule in it), it is fair to assume that we are unable to 
answer the question of which individual emission did in fact cause harm – and that we 
will be so for the foreseeable future. Given this limitation, there are a number of potential 
responses to the first problem of attribution.  
First, given that there is reasonable doubt that a person has caused harm, we can deny 
liability for compensation. This response faces the problem that the set of those liable to 
pay compensation for loss and damage due to anthropogenic climate change will be 
empty. Therefore, even an otherwise convincing theory of compensation will not be 
applicable in practice because it fails in the face of massive uncertainties about the past.  
Second we can, for practical purposes, make individuals responsible to compensate for 
the damage they have hypothetically caused – as measured by the negative expected value 
of their emissions (or a similar measure). This approach is problematic because it is based 
on hypothetical rather than actual harm. It may provide us with a sensible approach to 
covering the cost incurred by emitting, but strictly speaking individuals are no longer 
made responsible for the actual harm they have caused. If administered via an assessment 
of the expected value of specific emissions, the approach has the advantage of taking into 
consideration what was to be expected and, therefore, potentially lining up with a version 
of subjective consequentialism. However, this approach to the question of administration 
is also prohibitively complicated if not impossible to implement. 
Third, we may assume that all emissions have “triggered” harm and that all emissions 
have triggered the same amount of harm. Therefore, compensation is due accordingly: 
compensatory liability is assessed, based on the relative contribution an individual has 
made to the sum of all emissions. One may reasonably ask in which way this pro rata 
approach is different from the expected value approach discussed above. In fact, if all 
emitters are assumed to have identical information about the potential harmfulness of 
their emissions, the two approaches may come to the same result. However, should one 
person – for whatever reason – possess information making it plausible that her 
emissions will be less harmful than average, the two approaches diverge in their 
assessments of the compensation that is due. Under the circumstances described, the 
person in question would have to pay more compensation based on the pro rata account 
than based on the account of expected value. As compared to the expected value approach 
to compensation, the pro rata approach does not pose particular challenges of 
implementation but apparently fails to take into account the essence of theories of 
compensation: namely that the liable party must make those harmed as well off as they 
would have been had the liable party not done the harmful act.3 
Before considering a solution to the first problem of attribution, it is worth taking into 
account that a second and third problem of attribution loom on the horizon. Thus far, we 
                                                        
3 See, for example, Nozick (1974: 57). 
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have considered the question whether a specific set of emissions has in fact caused harm 
– any harm. A second problem of attribution arises in the other direction and concerns 
the question of whether a specific harm (e.g. a flood or a heat wave) was even caused by 
anthropogenic climate change. While climatologists are making advances in assessing the 
probability that particular climatic events and their effects have been caused by 
anthropogenic climate change, uncertainty regarding these matters is likely to remain 
forever. Therefore, even if it is agreed that emitters are responsible for anthropogenic 
climate change, one may argue that certain extreme weather events should not be 
compensated for because they cannot definitely be attributed to anthropogenic climate 
change. Again, such a view would stop the practical application of a theory of 
compensation for anthropogenic climate change in its tracks because it is unlikely that 
any climatic event will ever be definitely attributed to anthropogenic climate change.   
For a full account of compensatory liabilities we would further need to know which 
specific harm was caused by whom and how severe that harm was. A full account would 
require this information because we need to know how much compensation is due to 
whom by whom and why. This is the third problem of attribution, and while it is of the 
same kind as the first problem, it is even more intractable.  The potential to know which 
molecule has triggered which harm (be it a flood, a storm, or a coastal erosion) is mere 
fantasy. On the one hand, the third problem of attribution is unsurmountable and stands 
as it is: in all likelihood we will simply never know – even if we knew which emissions 
caused any harm at all (which would provide us with a solution to the first problem of 
attribution). On the other hand, the third problem of attribution is of more moderate 
theoretical and practical relevance. What is important is that those who were harmed are 
compensated and that those responsible for the harm will bear the costs. By whom the 
victims are compensated – and specifically if they are compensated by those who have 
triggered the specific harm in question – is of much lower normative relevance. 
To review: The first problem of attribution concerns the question of whether a specific set 
of emissions did in fact trigger harm. The second problem of attribution arises because it 
is fundamentally uncertain whether a specific harm was indeed caused by anthropogenic 
climate change. The third problem of attribution relates to the query which specific harm 
was caused by whom. The best way of addressing these problems is to change their order. 
I will consider the second, third, and first problem in turn. 
That we cannot know whether a specific harm is due to anthropogenic climate change is 
problematic at least in theory. Having to pay compensation for the consequences of an 
event one did not cause would be unjust. Not receiving compensation for harm caused by 
others would also be unjust. Therefore, a decision mechanism that assigns harmful 
climatic events to either the group of events caused by anthropogenic climate change or 
the group not caused by anthropogenic climate change may either make correct or false 
positive and false negative assessments. How to design such a mechanism and in 
particular whether to make it more adverse to false negative or false positive assessments 
is a case of judgments about values as well as risk and/or uncertainty.4 
Crucially though, the decision mechanism in question will assign duties to compensate 
and rights to receive compensation between two groups of very unequal size. On the one 
hand the emitters comprise a very large number of states, companies, and individuals. On 
the other hand the individuals harmed by a specific flood or storm, are comparatively few. 
Additionally, the question of whether compensation must be paid for a specific event will 
probably be of vital importance to those who were harmed by it and only of moderate or 
                                                        
4 See, for example, Hayenhjelm and Wolff (2011). 
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even miniscule importance to those who may have to offer compensation for it.5   In short, 
emitters – rather than victims – are much better able to tolerate the risk that is associated 
with a false decision by the decision mechanism. Therefore, it is plausible that the 
decision mechanism should err on the side of caution and rather judge on a natural event 
to be caused by anthropogenic climate change than judge on an event that is due to 
anthropogenic climate change to be a natural event. 
Nevertheless, given that uncertainties will remain it may be unjustifiably costly to avoid 
any and all false negative judgments because it would potentially imply that emitters 
would have to cover the costs of all climatic events – be they of natural or of 
anthropogenic origin. Of course, the argument for such a tendency does not make for a 
functional decision mechanism in and of itself. The most important components of such a 
mechanism are, of course, detailed assessments by climatologists and contributors from 
other relevant sciences. However, as far as the contributions of ethicists are concerned, 
taking into account special vulnerabilities, the ability to bear certain risks, and the 
distribution of costs are essential. The best way to deal with these challenges is to have 
emitters make certain contributions to a central fund (see below) that in turn 
compensates, based on a suitable decision mechanism, those who were harmed to the 
extent they were harmed. 
As it turns out, the decision to administer the compensation in question by way of a 
central fund not only solves the second but also neatly solves the third problem of 
attribution. As discussed above, we do not know, and probably will never know, which 
specific harm was caused by which specific emitter. However, as argued before, what is 
crucially important is that those who are harmed are also compensated. Who pays that 
compensation is normatively less significant – as long as they are emitters and they do 
not “overpay” beyond their duty to compensate. Therefore, as long as the relations 
between emitters and climate victims is arranged by a central fund, we no longer need to 
concern ourselves with the question of whose contribution flows to whom. All that 
matters is that victims are compensated to the extent that they have been harmed and 
that emitters contribute to the central compensatory fund to the extent that they are 
liable. 
This diagnosis leads us directly to the first problem of attribution and the question of 
whether a specific set of emissions did in fact trigger harm. Unfortunately, the first 
problem of attribution cannot be nicely solved by administering the compensation via a 
central fund. For, even if it is unlikely, it is in theory possible that a person’s lifetime 
emissions did not make a difference to climate change or a least that some parts of the 
person’s lifetime emissions did not make such a difference. Therefore, it may on the whole 
be unjustified that this particular person contributes to the fund. Alternatively, pro rata 
liability that assesses compensatory duties based on the total amount emitted by a person 
relative to overall anthropogenic emissions may be also unjustified.  
Further, we do not have the argument based on group size and severity of harm at our 
disposal to argue for a contribution to the fund. Whether an emitter must contribute to 
the fund is unlikely to be inconsequential for that emitter. In fact it will probably be a 
considerable burden to the emitter, although it is improbable that that burden is 
comparable to the burden of being an uncompensated climate change victim. However, 
these two burdens cannot be directly compared because the failure of one individual to 
contribute to the fund does not cause a climate victim not to be compensated. Rather, the 
                                                        
5 It may appear to be the case that this result does not hold in the context of territorial 
compensation because territory is essential to either those who compensate or those who receive 
compensation. However, if the precise mechanism of territorial compensation is structured 
correctly, this worry does not apply. See Dietrich/Wündisch (manuscript). 
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fund structure is implemented to avoid these direct relations between emitters and 
victims because the links are so uncertain. Therefore, if one person is required to 
contribute without justification, this presents a significant burden to that person. If a 
person is not required to contribute although she should be, this presents a miniscule 
burden to an enormous number of individuals who are, however, likely to be significantly 
worse off.  
Even though these considerations cannot offer support for addressing the first problem of 
attribution by means of a pro rata distribution of compensatory liability amongst 
emitters, there are strong alternative arguments to that effect. In essence, these 
arguments all draw on the significant risks that come along with choosing liability 
distribution schemes other than the pro-rata approach. To make this case, I will compare 
the pro-rata approach with an approach of assigning compensation liabilities based on 
actual harm caused. This account based on actual harm is, of course, hypothetical, as we 
face the problem of not knowing what that harm is. However, even if we could 
retrospectively assess that harm, individually and precisely, there are good reasons to rely 
on a pro-rata account nonetheless. Therefore, the pro rata account will emerge as 
preferable in any case. 
Given that we have very limited information about the climate system, our prospective 
assessment of potential harms due to emissions may correctly be based on the 
assumption of a linear relationship between emissions and harm. Therefore, we may 
reasonably assume that all emissions cause the same amount of harm in the future. This 
assumption corresponds to the pro-rata account and a basic account of expected value. 
Which share of the liabilities each emitter must shoulder is, therefore, highly predictable 
even for individual emitters, as long as we assume that individual and collective emissions 
are predictable on the whole. Overall predictability in this context is not a big obstacle to 
overcome because we only need to be able to accurately predict our relative contribution 
to overall emission. Given that total collective emissions change rather sluggishly and are 
well forecasted, each individual emitter only needs additionally to be able to forecast her 
own emissions. If we assume that this is possible with a reasonable level of accuracy, 
individual compensatory liability based on the pro-rata account will be easily anticipated 
in approximation. 
The contrary is true in the context of an account based on actual harm. Given that 
anthropogenic climate change is characterized by marked threshold effects, it is not 
unlikely that the emissions of some emitters will cause exorbitant damage, while the 
emissions of others will cause no or little damage. Therefore, actual harm accounts of 
liability for compensation would introduce very severe additional risk to society. Given 
that people can generally be assumed to be highly risk averse when it comes to high risk 
scenarios, it may well be to the advantage of everybody – even those who learn after the 
fact that their emissions have not caused any harm – to avoid these risks by means of a 
pro-rata account.6 This would make the pro rata account Pareto superior to the actual 
                                                        
6 As stated at the end of section two I, for the purpose of this paper, disregard considerations of 
excusable ignorance. As an aside consider the following scenario: It is universally known that 
emissions cause harm. The expected value theory is universally accepted as a means of answering 
the question of what one should do. Twenty years from now, a supercomputer is developed that is 
able to analyze the climate system in such detail as to provide specific information about the 
harmfulness of every individual’s emissions. A central question that arises due to this development 
is the following: “Should we use this information to assess individual compensatory liabilities with 
respect to past emissions?” I suggest that we should not do so because while people were aware of 
the general harmfulness of their emissions, they could not have been expected to take into 
consideration that some emissions are completely harmless while others may trigger exorbitant 
harms. Therefore, it would be unjustified to retrospectively expose emitters to these risks of 
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harm account. The pro-rata account is able to effectively address the first problem of 
attribution.  
4. Conclusion   
As a conclusion, while three distinct problems of attribution plague any theory of 
compensation for loss and damage due to anthropogenic climate change, two of them can 
be neatly solved by a fund-based compensation scheme. The remaining (and first) 
problem of attribution cannot be solved by the fund-based scheme but, nevertheless, 
normative and practical considerations heavily favor a pro rata fund approach which in 
turn makes the first problem of attribution practically obsolete. Therefore, the pro-rata 
fund approach offers a framework for theories of compensation for loss and damage due 
to anthropogenic climate change that is resilient in the face of three central problems of 
attribution.  
Joachim Wündisch 
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf 
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compensation. A fairer means of distribution burdens would be the pro rata or the expected value 
approach. 
The prospective version of the question may be equally interesting: “Should we use the new 
technology to assess individual compensatory liabilities for future emissions?” Strictly speaking, it 
may not be unjustified to do this if the fact of how compensatory liabilities are to be assessed in the 
future is known beforehand. Especially if the supercomputer could provide real-time information 
about the connection between emissions that are just about to occur and future harms, such a 
regulation may be very helpful. However, in the more likely scenario that such real time information 
is lacking, the liability assessment scheme described would introduce massive additional risks to 
society (as compared to a pro rata assessment) while offering few benefits. Either these risks would 
need to be mediated by functioning insurance markets or equivalent legislation may be normatively 
well justified. 
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